Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he federal estate tax allows a deduction for every dollar bequeathed to charitable organizations. By effectively lowering the relative price of charitable bequests, the deduction provides future decedents with a strong incentive to make charitable bequests over bequests to other heirs.
Previous studies on this topic usually fi nd that both the estate tax (or tax price) and after tax wealth are signifi cant determinants of charitable bequests. However, to determine the effi ciency of the estate tax, previous studies also estimate wealth and price elasticities of charitable bequests. 1 Since the effi ciency of the tax will depend on both of these elasticities, a precise estimate of the price elasticity is important for policy. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, price elasticities from previous studies may be biased by multiple factors. First, cross-sectional studies are often forced to rely on strong assumptions about the marital deduction or the model's functional form to identify the price effect.
2 If these assumptions fail, the price elasticity will be overestimated. Second, all of the previous studies derive the charity price from the tax schedule in place at the time of death. Since charitable bequests are determined at the time the will is written, a more accurate price might be derived from the date-of-will tax schedule. Measurement error from using the incorrect price will bias the price elasticity estimate toward zero. Finally, datasets used in previous studies only include estates that fi le a federal estate tax return. Since only the wealthiest estates are required to fi le a federal return, these studies omit most of the wealth distribution. According to Piketty and Saez (2001) , only 4.35 percent of all decedents fi led a federal estate tax return in 1997. Consequently, price elasticities from these studies are relevant only for the very wealthy. Price elasticity estimates for the non-wealthy are important for state tax policy because many non-fi lers face state estate and inheritance taxes.
By employing data from 1980-82 San Francisco County probate decedents and exploiting the tax changes that occurred during this period, this paper adds to the existing literature in several ways. First, since the identification approach uses cross-year variation in tax rates, I eliminate the marital deduction as a source of variation and rely less on functional form assumptions. Second, using available information on the date of will, I estimate models with tax prices derived from the date-of-will tax schedule. This allows a comparison between the date-of-death and date-of-will tax prices and provides evidence about which is the stronger determinant of charitable bequests. Finally, I estimate price elasticities for the non-wealthy portion of the wealth distribution.
Results from Tobit regressions suggest that assumptions about functional form can bias price elasticity estimates for fi lers of the federal estate tax return. Including a quadratic wealth term in the charitable bequest equation captures much of the nonlinear wealth effect in this data. I fi nd that employing the marital deduction as a source of variation does not greatly bias the price elasticity. However, I present evidence that the assumption of predetermined spousal bequests, which is needed to employ this source of variation, is not an accurate model of the charityspouse bequest decision. The date-of-will tax price and date-of-death tax price are both found to be significantly related to charitable bequests. Price elasticity estimates for estates that fi led a federal estate tax return range from -1.45 to -1.25 when the date-of-death price is used, and -2.54 to -1.23 when the date-of-will price is used. These estimates are within the range of previous studies. For nonwealthy estates that did not fi le a return, price elasticities range from -6.16 to -5.72 when the date-of-death price is used, and -3.13 to -0.62 when the date-of-will price is used.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the empirical approaches of previous papers, the third section describes the previous research, and the fourth section describes the federal estate tax and California inheritance tax. The fi fth section and sixth sections describe the data and discuss the identifi cation approach, respectively. The seventh section presents results and the eighth section concludes.
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL APPROACHES

Sources of Variation
Within-Year Variation
A major challenge in studies of the estate tax and charitable bequests is the separate identifi cation of wealth and tax price effects. 3 Since the tax price is largely a function of estate size, these variables are likely to be highly collinear. Identifi cation can be particularly diffi cult in cross-sectional studies because there is little variation in price that is independent of estate size. Previous studies, which typically employ a single year of cross-sectional data, are forced to rely solely on withinyear variation in marginal tax rates for identifi cation. Using the nonlinearity of the tax schedule, the broadness of the tax brackets, the marital deduction, and other sources of within-year variation, these studies have been very successful in obtaining signifi cant estimates of wealth and price effects. 4 Unfortunately, within-year variation will produce unbiased estimates of the price effect only under certain assumptions. In particular, variation from the marital deduction and nonlinearity of the tax schedule require strong assumptions about spousal bequests and the functional form, respectively. Relaxation of these assumptions will not only reduce the potential bias, but also eliminate the main sources of variation. Thus, researchers face a tradeoff of identifi cation for unbiasedness. The remainder of this section describes these identifi cation assumptions in greater detail and illustrates why biased price estimates will result if the assumptions fail.
The marital deduction generates an exogenous source of variation under the assumption that spousal bequests are determined before charitable bequests. For estates of the same wealth, variation in spousal bequests creates variation in the taxable estate and, hence, in marginal tax rates. This assumption is dangerous if, instead of being predetermined, spousal bequests are determined jointly with charitable bequests. In this situation, reliance on the marital deduction as a source of variation will yield a biased estimate of the tax price effect. Larger spousal bequests imply both a lower marginal tax rate and a smaller charitable bequest, thus indicating a positive association between tax rates and charitable bequests (and a negative association between price and charitable bequests). Cross-sectional studies can easily avoid this bias by ignoring the marital deduction, but doing so eliminates a potentially important source of variation.
Variation from the nonlinearity of the tax schedule will produce unbiased price estimates as long as the correct functional form is employed. Typically, previous studies utilize this source of variation by assuming that only linear price and estate terms enter the charitable bequest equation. The implicit assumption is that polynomial and interaction terms of estate and price are not significant determinants of charitable bequests. The problem with this identifi cation approach is that because it is impossible to know the true functional form a priori, price estimates will always be biased (Feenberg, 1987) . Moreover, since price is a nonlinear function of estate size, price may serve as a proxy for excluded nonlinear estate terms (Bakija, 2000) . Attempts to reduce this bias by adding nonlinear terms increase the chance of perfect multicollinearity between the price and estate variables. Again, there is a tradeoff of unbiasedness and identification. The empirical approach utilized here tackles this problem by including nonlinear wealth terms to reduce bias, and relying on cross-year variation to avoid multicollinearity.
Cross-Year Variation
The cross-year variation in this study is generated from changes in the federal estate tax and California inheritance tax across years. These tax changes are described in the fourth section. Cross-year variation is advantageous because the variation in marginal tax rates is independent of spousal bequests and functional form. Further, since these specific tax changes affect the entire wealth distribution, the variation is largely independent of estate size.
Date-of-Will Versus Date-of-Death Tax Price
Previous studies all use a tax price based on the date-of-death tax schedule. The implicit assumption in these studies is that the tax rate at the date of death is the only rate individuals consider when making the charitable bequest decision. Since the decedent's will typically dictates the amount left to charity, a more plausible assumption might be that the date-of-will tax rate is the rate individuals consider. However, even this rate may be incorrect because, whether they do it or not, individuals always have the option to update their wills up until the date-of-death. Individuals who do not update their wills to refl ect tax changes implicitly accept the date-of-death tax price. Perhaps the most realistic assumption is that some bequests are based on the date-of-will tax rate, and some are based on the date-of-death tax rate.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to know which is the relevant tax rate for each decedent. Consequently, regardless of the tax rate employed, the tax price will be measured with error. As Clotfelter (1985) points out, measurement error can be especially large in studies that use cross-year variation: unless decedents respond immediately to tax changes by rewriting their wills, some bequests will be a function of current tax laws and others will be a function of previous tax laws. Measurement error in the tax price will bias the price coeffi cient toward zero.
One of the goals of this study is to determine which tax price is the stronger determinant of charitable bequests. Probate records are well suited to address this issue; unlike datasets employed in previous studies, they contain information on the date of a decedent's most recent will revision. I attempt to answer the question of applicable tax price by estimating the following models. First, I separately estimate models with the date-of-death and the date-of-will tax prices. The price elasticity estimates from these models provide evidence as to which tax price is more relevant. Second, I include both prices in the same equation. Third, I estimate models for decedents who rewrote their wills in the year of their death.
In addition to models that use date-ofdeath and date-of-will tax prices, I estimate models that incorporate expectations about future tax rates into the tax price. Since new tax rates were scheduled to be phased in gradually at the time of this data, some individuals' bequest decisions may be based on future tax rates.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In the fi rst study of charitable bequests and the estate tax, McNees (1973) employs data from 1957 and 1959 estate tax returns and fi nds that the estate tax has a signifi cant effect on the size of charitable bequests. Although the data consist of multiple cross sections, identification comes primarily from within-year variation in tax rates, because there were no tax changes across years.
Using the same 1957-1959 data, as well as data from 1969 federal estate tax returns, Boskin (1976) estimates Tobit models and fi nds price elasticities that range from -1.8 to -0.94 for the 1957-1959 data, and -2.53 to -0.2 for the 1969 data. Both datasets are cross sectional and identifi cation of the tax price comes from the large sample size, the nonlinearity of the tax schedule, and the wide tax brackets. Feldstein (1977) uses pooled data on charitable bequests, classifi ed by gross estate, for the years 1948 through 1963. Since there were no tax changes during this period, the tax price is identified primarily by within-year variation in the marginal tax rate. The estimated tax price elasticities range from -4.0 to -0.1. Barthold and Plotnick (1984) use a sample of wealthy estates drawn from Connecticut probate records during the 1930s and 1940s.
6 Their paper is the fi rst to identify the tax price effect by applying cross-year variation to individual level data. Coincidentally, it is also the only study to fi nd that the estate tax is not a signifi cant determinant of charitable bequests.
Clotfelter (1985) employs a sample of 1976 federal estate tax returns and estimates Tobit models. He relies on within-year variation to identify the tax price and estimates price elasticities that range from -2.79 to -1.67. Joulfaian (1991) uses federal estate tax returns for 1986 decedents. He estimates Tobit models relying on within-year variation in tax rates for identifi cation and estimates a price elasticity of -3.0. Auten and Joulfaian (1996) use a sample of federal estate tax returns for 1982 decedents matched to their 1981 income tax returns as well as the 1981 income tax returns of their children. They rely on within-year variation to identify the tax price effect. Estimating Tobit models and controlling for children's income, age and marital status, they report a price elasticity of -2.5. Joulfaian (2000) analyzes estate tax data from 1992 decedents. He relies on within-year variation to identify the tax price effect and estimates price elasticities that range from -2.69 to -0.73.
Joulfaian (2001) Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod (2003) use aggregate data classifi ed into cells based on year, state, wealth and marital status combinations. Data is available for fi ve wealth categories and 39 years between 1924 and 1998. Identifi cation comes from cross-year and cross-state variation in tax rates. Estimating expenditure share equations, they report price elasticities of -2.14 to -1.62. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) use time series data from estate tax returns covering 52 years between 1921 and 1998. Controlling for wealth, a time trend, the top income tax price, and three separate measures of charitable bequest price, they report that the estate tax has a signifi cant effect on charitable bequests.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ESTATE TAX AND CALIFORNIA INHERITANCE TAX
The estates in this study are subject to the federal estate tax and the California inheritance tax. Since this paper uses data from the years 1980-82, I describe the estate tax law as it stood during these years.
For estate tax purposes, the gross estate includes all property owned by a decedent at the time of death. For married decedents, the gross estate consists of all of the decedent's separate property and one half of the couple's interest in community property. Deductions are allowed for debts, charitable bequests and spousal bequests.
The estate tax rate schedule is levied on the taxable estate. For individuals dying in 1980, the marginal tax rates range from 18 percent on the fi rst $10,000 of taxable estate to 70 percent on estates over $5,000,000.
There are two major tax credits that apply to the estates of all decedents: the unifi ed credit and the credit for state death taxes paid. The unifi ed credit effectively exempts estates from all tax liability up to a certain level of wealth. For example, in 1980 the unifi ed credit was equal to $42,500, which yields a total exemption for estates valued at $161,000 or less. For estates above this exemption level, the effective marginal tax rate begins at 32 percent.
The maximum credit for state death taxes is determined according to a rate schedule applied to the adjusted taxable estate. The rates range from zero to 16 percent. Whether or not this credit covers all of the state death tax liability depends on the tax laws of the particular state.
An inheritance tax differs from an estate tax by the way in which the tax is determined. Unlike an estate tax, which has one tax schedule, an inheritance tax allows heirs different exemption levels and tax schedules. Spouses, followed by children, receive the most favorable tax treatment, with relatively large exemptions and low marginal tax rates. Strangers (or non-relatives) receive the lowest exemption and are taxed at higher tax rates. Similar to the federal estate tax, there is a deduction for bequests left to charities. The California inheritance tax was introduced in 1853, and then repealed and reintroduced several times throughout its history. 8 The inheritance tax was scaled back signifi cantly in 1981, before its repeal on June 8, 1982.
DATA
The data in this paper were extracted from the probate records of the San Francisco County Superior Court. The data include all San Francisco residents who died and whose estates went through the probate court from 1980 to 1982.
9 There are a total of 5,688 observations. After removing 28 observations with missing information and ten observations for 1979 decedents, the result is a dataset of 5,650 estates.
The data include information on all of a decedent's assets at the time of death, charitable and spousal bequests, and bequests made to other heirs. 10 In addition, demographic variables, trust use, and the date of the decedent's will are also available.
Probate records do not include all San Francisco decedents. Missing from the sample are decedents with zero gross estates, zero net estates and estates where no heirs could be found.
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Certain estates worth less than $30,000 can qualify for summary probate and avoid the probate proceedings.
12 An unknown number of cases were either lost or stolen from the court files and are, consequently, not included in the sample. 13 Estates can completely avoid the probate process if they are composed entirely of non-probate assets. However, estates composed partially of non-probate assets still pass through the probate court, and all of the non-pro-8 See University of San Diego Legal Research Center at http://www.sandiego.edu/lrc/taxation_code. html#inherbhistory for a description. 9 Probate is the legal process that settles and distributes the estate of a decedent whether or not a will exists.
In order for an estate to pass through the San Francisco probate court, the decedent must meet residency requirements. Residency typically hinges on where a decedent is registered to vote. 10 "Non-probate" assets such as trusts, joint tenancy assets, pensions, annuities, and life insurance are available in the records for decedents who died before June 8, 1982. 11 Assets held outside of the state of California are not required to be included in probate records. 12 Estates worth less than $30,000 can avoid probate by having a qualifi ed heir fi le an "affi davit of right." A qualifi ed heir must be entitled to the decedent's estate (usually by will) and must be a surviving spouse, child, parent, sibling or other blood relative. See Clifford (1984 ), West Publishing Co. (1980 , and Marshall (1979 Marshall ( -1987 for more information. 13 In particular, many cases were missing or unavailable for viewing in 1980.
bate assets are included in the probate records.
14 The decedents in these probate records are wealthier than individuals nationally. Compared to wealthholders in the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 1982 probate decedents have higher average net worth ($301,419 versus $104,681) and higher median net worth ($170,002 versus $39,905) .
The wealthiest probate decedents, however, are very similar to the wealthiest decedents nationally. In 1982, the average gross estate reported on federal estate tax returns (for estates worth $300,000 or more) was $761,984.
15 For 1982 San Francisco probate decedents with gross estates over $300,000, the average gross estate of $769,481 is nearly identical.
Key Variables
Four different prices are defi ned for the tax price of charitable bequests. First, I compute two prices using the date-of-death tax schedule: one uses the marital deduction as a source of tax rate variation, while the other does not. I then compute the same two prices but instead use the tax schedule in place at the date of will. 16 The price of a dollar of charitable bequests is equal to one minus the marginal tax rate.
The marginal tax rate is equal to the federal tax rate plus the state rate, minus the credit for state taxes paid. For the prices that use the marital deduction as a source of variation, the federal rate is computed by assuming all charitable bequests are equal to zero, subtracting spousal bequests from the net estate, and tracing the relevant marginal tax rate. This procedure follows that of previous studies, and it assumes that spousal bequests are exogenously determined before making charitable bequests. For the prices that do not use the marital deduction as a source of variation, the federal rate is computed in the same fashion, except that spousal bequests are not subtracted from the net estate.
Computation of the state rate is slightly more complicated because the California inheritance tax rate varies by the type of heir receiving the bequest. I define the state rate as a weighted average of the marginal tax rates that would have been faced by the non-charity heirs if no charitable bequest had been made. This defi nition assumes that if no charitable bequest had been made, the proportion of the after-tax estate going to each heir would remain the same. In cases where all of the estate is left to charity (about 7.6 percent of all estates which make charitable bequests in the data), I use the tax rate that would have been faced by a non-relative.
17
Since this study examines whether or not spousal bequests are exogenously determined before charitable bequests, I also compute the price of spousal bequests. This tax price is computed as follows:
where t h is the marginal tax rate faced by an heir, and t S is the marginal tax rate faced by the spouse. The marginal tax rate for the heir, t h , is computed by assuming all of the estate is left to an heir and tracing out the relevant tax rate. Similarly, the mar-14 For example, one estate made its way into the probate records even though it was composed of only $250 worth of probate assets and over $170,000 worth of non-probate assets. Non-probate assets are trust assets, joint tenancy assets, annuities, pensions and life insurance. 15 This number was calculated from Figure A in Bentz (1984) . 16 When computing the date-of-will tax price, I use the tax rate as of the date-of-will that applies to the wealth level at the date-of-death. Wealth levels are not adjusted for infl ation in the analyses that use the date-of-will tax price. 17 For decedents with children, I use the child marginal tax rate.
ginal tax rate for the spouse is computed by assuming all of the estate is left to the spouse and tracing the relevant rate. With an unlimited marital deduction, t S = 0 and the spouse price is equal to 1 -t h , which is equivalent to the price of charitable bequests. With no marital deduction, spousal bequests are treated the same as bequests to other heirs, t S = t h , and P s = 1. Since variation in t h will not differentiate the spousal bequest price from the charitable bequest price, identifi cation of the spousal bequest price requires cross-year variation in the marital deduction, or t S .
The gross estate includes the appraised value of all of a decedent's assets including lifetime gifts made within four years of death. The net estate is equal to the gross estate minus debts and expenses. The measure of wealth in this study is equal to the net estate minus the estate's tax liability had zero charitable bequests been made. (at death, marital) is the date-of-death tax price using the marital deduction as a source of variation. Price (at death, no marital) is the date-of-death tax price without the marital deduction. Price (will date, marital) is the date-of-will tax price using the marital deduction as a source of variation. Price (will date, no marital) is the date-of-will tax price without the marital deduction. date-of-will tax schedule are present for 4,638 of the 5,650 estates.
The average tax price using the dateof-death tax schedule is 0.81 if the marital deduction is a source of variation, and 0.80 if it is not. Average prices are always higher for estates that make no charitable bequest.
Other important variables are trust use and religion. Trust use gives some indication of the extent to which the decedent has planned for the disposition of his or her estate. Nearly 14 percent of estates indicate the use of either a testamentary or inter vivos trust. Religion is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the decedent is a member of an organized religion.
18 Religious individuals, who make up at least 18.7 percent of the sample, may be more inclined to contribute to charity.
Business owners may have less liquid estates and consequently be less inclined to give to charity. On average, business assets make up about one percent of a decedent's estate. Joulfaian (2000) , Joulfaian (1991) , and Boskin (1976) . Turning to non-filers, only 10.3 percent make charitable bequests. As expected, the tax prices are much higher among non-fi lers, and the presence of a will is more common among fi lers (90.6 percent) than non-fi lers (75.4 percent). (at death, marital) is the date-of-death tax price using the marital deduction as a source of variation. Price (at death, no marital) is the date-of-death tax price without the marital deduction. Price (will date, marital) is the date-of-will tax price using the marital deduction as a source of variation. Price (will date, no marital) is the date-of-will tax price without the marital deduction.
IDENTIFICATION APPROACH
Charitable Bequest Price
I use both within-year and cross-year variation in marginal tax rates to identify the tax price of charitable bequests. The only previous study to apply both cross-year and within-year variation to individual level data is Barthold and Plotnick (1984) . 20 Referring first to the date-of-death tax price, cross-year variation comes from the tax reductions that occurred at the federal and state level in 1981 and 1982. These changes are described in the Appendix and include an expansion of the marital deduction, a reduction in marginal tax rates, and an increase in exemption levels. The average tax price increases from 0.781 in 1980 to 0.784 in 1981 and 0.831 in 1982.
Cross-year variation for the date-ofwill tax price comes primarily from the many tax changes that occurred from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s Within-year variation comes from the broadness of the tax brackets, the nonlinearity of the tax schedule, and the California inheritance tax's differential application of tax rates by heir type for estates of a given size. In order to reduce bias from within-year variation, the marital deduction is not employed as a source of variation. Further, I attempt to reduce the variation coming from the nonlinearity of the tax schedule by including nonlinear wealth terms in the regressions. A primary benefi t of employing cross-year variation is that it allows the inclusion of nonlinear wealth terms in the charitable bequest equation.
Previous studies typically use the tax price based on the fi rst dollar marginal tax rate. The attractive feature of this price is that it is exogenous to the size of charitable bequests. The theoretically correct price, however, is based on the last dollar marginal tax rate. Unfortunately, this price is endogenous. In order to use the theoretically correct price and address the enodgeneity issue, I instrument the last dollar price with the fi rst dollar price. I fi nd that instrumental variable estimates are similar to the estimates using the fi rst dollar tax price alone. Since the conclusions are the same for both estimates, I use the fi rst dollar tax price in all of the regressions that follow.
Spousal Bequest Price
As noted in the fi fth section, identifi cation of the spousal bequest price requires cross-year variation in the marital deduction. At the federal level, this variation comes from the introduction of the unlimited marital deduction in 1982. Prior to 1982, most California decedents were eligible for only part, or none, of the available marital deduction, because federal estate tax law applied special rules to community property states like California. Under these rules, if any part of the estate was composed of community property, the available marital deduction was substantially reduced. If the estate was composed entirely of community property, no marital deduction would be available. In the data, community property makes up an average of 84 percent of a decedent's gross estate. About 72 percent of estates are composed entirely of community property. As a consequence, there is substantial variation in the available marital deduction between 1982 and pre-1982 decedents.
At the state level, an unlimited marital deduction was introduced in 1981. The state and federal changes to the marital deduction are refl ected in the data. The average spousal bequest price drops from 0.98 in 1980 to 0.89 in 1981 and 0.75 in 1982. Table 3 presents results of Tobit regressions of charitable bequests. In this set of regressions, the price variable is derived from the date-of-death tax schedule, and the marital deduction is not used as a source of variation. Consequently, the price variable is identifi ed only through cross-year variation, the nonlinearity of the tax schedule, and the broadness of the tax brackets. The nonlinearity of the tax schedule is reduced as a source of variation in columns 3 through 6, where polynomials, an interaction term, and wealth indicators are added. The dependent variable is charitable bequests/wealth and the sample is limited to estates that were required to fi le a federal estate tax return.
RESULTS
In column 1, where price, a linear wealth term, and control variables enter as regressors, price is highly signifi cant with an elasticity estimate of -1.34. Wealth is insignifi cant with an elasticity of 1.04.
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Married decedents bequeath less than non-married decedents. Charitable bequests decrease with the number of children and the business share of the estate. Belonging to an organized religion has a strong positive effect on charitable giving. Trust use and gender are insignifi cant determinants of charitable bequests. Age is dropped in columns 2 through 6 because it is insignifi cant and missing for 457 estates. Barthold and Plotnick (1984) also fi nd age to be an insignifi cant determinant of charitable bequests.
The changes that occur in columns 2 through 6 demonstrate the sensitivity of the price elasticity to the functional form employed. The specifi cation in column 2 is similar to that employed by most previous studies in that it includes only a linear wealth term. The price elasticity estimate is equal to -1.45 and is highly signifi cant. This estimate falls within the range of estimates from previous studies for federal estate tax fi lers. The wealth elasticity estimate of 1.04 is signifi cant at the ten percent level. Adding wealth squared to the model, in column 3, reduces the price elasticity estimate to -1.25 and increases the wealth elasticity estimate to 1.13. Both are highly significant. The price and wealth elasticity estimates remain at -1.25 and 1.13, respectively, when wealth cubed is added to the specifi cation in column 4. When an interaction is included, in column 5, the price elasticity estimate increases to -1.31 and the wealth elasticity estimate decreases to 1.06. Column 6 presents wealth interacted with indicators for each wealth quintile. This is a more fl exible specifi cation for wealth, and the price elasticity estimate is -1.33. Unfortunately, this specifi cation does not allow a single wealth elasticity estimate. Wealth elasticity estimates evaluated at the mean wealth for each quintile are 0.92, 0.89, 0.86, 0.87 and 1.08, respectively. Regardless of 21 The price and wealth elasticities with respect to charitable bequests are based on the unconditional expected value of charitable bequests/wealth and are evaluated at the mean values for all variables. In a Tobit specifi cation, the price elasticity is equal to Φ(z)*β*(PW/C), where Φ(z) is the cumulative distribution function, β is the coeffi cient on the price variable, P is the average charity price, W is the average wealth and C is the average charitable bequest. When an interaction term is included, the elasticity is equal to Φ(z)*(β + δW)*(PW/C), where δ is the coeffi cient on the interaction term. The wealth elasticity is equal to:
, where α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , and δ are the coeffi cients on the wealth, wealth squared, wealth cubed, and the interaction term, respectively. Table 4 presents regression results for estates that did not fi le a federal estate tax return. These estates represent the part of the wealth distribution that has been ignored in previous studies. Spouse, number of children, trust and religion are all significantly related to 22 The price and wealth elasticity estimates follow the same pattern when the fi rst dollar price is used as an instrument for the last dollar price. Instrumental variable price elasticity estimates for regressions paralleling those in Table 3 These elasticities are much larger than the price elasticity estimates for fi lers. Wealth elasticities are also highly signifi cant and range from 0.75 to 1.19. Tables 5 and 6 present price and wealth elasticity estimates, respectively, by sample (fi led a federal estate tax return, did not fi le a return, or entire sample), specifi cation, and tax price (date-of-death versus date-of-will tax price). The specifi cations differ by the wealth terms included in the regressions. All specifi cations control for spouse, male, number of children, trust use, religion and business share.
The set of regressions in panel I of Table  5 and Table 6 uses the date-of-death tax price. Two sets of regressions are presented using the date-of-will tax price. In panel II, federal estate tax fi ling status is defi ned by the date-of-will tax law. This set assumes decedents base bequests on their date-of-will fi ling status. In panel III, estate tax fi ling status is defi ned by the date-of-death tax law. This set assumes that decedents base bequests on expectations about their date-of-death fi ling status. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate a number of interesting results for fi lers of the federal estate tax return. First, price elasticity estimates are smaller, and wealth elasticity estimates larger, as higher order wealth terms are added to the linear wealth 23 Since the fi ling threshold increased each year from 1980 to 1982, the wealth sample is not the same across years when it is limited to non-fi lers. To address this issue, I reran the regressions in Table 4 limiting the sample to estates worth less than $161,000 (the exemption level in 1980) and found that the price and wealth elasticities are similar. (1)). This pattern holds whether the date-of-death tax price is used, as in panel I, or the date-of-will tax prices are used, as in panels II and III. This pattern suggests that omission of nonlinear wealth terms may lead to overestimation of the price elasticity and underestimation of the wealth elasticity for fi lers.
Second, elasticity estimates are stable between the quadratic equation, in specifi cation (2), and the cubic equation, in specifi cation (3). Price elasticity estimates are identical and wealth elasticity estimates are nearly identical in these two specifications regardless of how tax price or fi ling status is defi ned. This suggests that the quadratic specifi cation adequately captures most of the nonlinear wealth effect.
Third, the wealth elasticities are nearly always greater than one. This number is large relative to most of the previous literature, but smaller than the estimates reported by Joulfaian (2001) and Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod (2003) .
Finally, the tax rates in place at the date the will was written are at least as important as the tax rates in place at the time of death in determining charitable bequests. Date-of-will tax price elasticities are greater than, or approximately equal to, the date-of-death tax price elasticities, depending on how fi ling status is defi ned. The date-of-will price elasticity estimates in panel II, with fi ling status defi ned by the date-of-will law, range from -1.44 to -1.23. These estimates are nearly equal to the date-of-death price elasticity estimates in panel I (which range from -1.45 to -1.25). This relationship holds for all specifi cations. The wealth elasticities in panel II are slightly smaller but highly signifi cant.
When fi ling status is defi ned by the date-of-death law, in panel III, the date- of-will price elasticities are much larger than the date-of-death price elasticities (ranging from -2.54 to -2.38). Wealth elasticity estimates are insignifi cant and smaller compared to the date-of-death price elasticities in panel I.
For non-fi lers, price elasticity estimates are generally larger when nonlinear wealth terms are added to the linear equation. This suggests that omission of nonlinear wealth terms may bias the price elasticity estimate, but not in the expected direction. Price elasticity estimates using the date-of-will price are much smaller than the date-of-death price elasticity estimates. When fi ling status is defi ned by the date-of-will tax law, the price elasticity estimates are highly signifi cant. When fi ling status is defi ned by the dateof-death tax law, the results are generally insignifi cant.
Looking at the entire sample of estates, in the third column of Tables 5 and 6 , price elasticities vary, but not in any consistent pattern, as nonlinear terms are added to the linear equation. Price elasticity estimates range from -0.87 to -0.60 when the date-of-death tax price is used, and from -0.66 to -0.31 when the date-of-will price is used. Price elasticity estimates are lower, and wealth elasticity estimates higher, when the date-of-will tax price is used. All price and wealth elasticities are statistically signifi cant.
The regression results in Table 7 are limited to filers and include both the date-of-death and the date-of-will tax prices as regressors. 24 Although these two prices are highly correlated (with an empirical correlation coeffi cient of 0.72), their effects are separately identified. Consistent with the results in Tables 5 and  6 , date-of-will price elasticities are larger than date-of-death price elasticities, and price elasticity estimates are lower, for both prices, as nonlinear wealth terms are added. The quadratic specifi cation captures much of the nonlinear wealth effect; price and wealth elasticity estimates are virtually identical in the quadratic and cubic equations. Wealth elasticity estimates are insignifi cant. Table 8 presents results for individuals who died the same year as their wills were written. For this select group, the date-of-will and date-of-death tax prices coincide. To the extent that individuals rewrite their wills to refl ect current tax law, measurement error in the price elasticity estimate will be lower. For fi lers, price elasticity estimates are larger (ranging from -2.48 to -1.79) than models that use the date-of-death tax price. Price elasticity estimates are also larger than one of the two models that use the date-of-will tax price (see Table 5 ). The wealth elasticity estimates are generally larger (ranging from 0.98 to 1.23) than the models that use the date-of-will or date-of-death tax prices. For non-fi lers, the price elasticity estimates (ranging from -4.95 to -4.86) are larger than models that use the date-of-will tax price, but smaller than models that use the date-of-death tax price. Wealth elasticity estimates are insignifi cant.
Expectations
Although the date-of-will and dateof-death tax prices are relevant for many decedents, it is also important to consider tax prices that refl ect a decedent's expectations. 25 With the passage of the Economics Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA-1981) tax rates were scheduled to decline, in step, from 70 percent in 1981 to 50 percent in 1985. Exemption levels were also scheduled to increase from $175,000 in 1981 to $600,000 in 1987. Consequently, the rel-evant tax rates for individuals who died post-ERTA-1981 may have been neither the date-of-death nor the date-of-will rate but, rather, the tax rate expected at some future date. Using mortality weighted tax rates to compute the tax price is one approach to modeling these expectations. However, since age is imputed for most decedents, I use the fully phased-in tax schedule with a 50 percent top rate and a $600,000 exemption level.
To model expectations, I assume that decedents who died prior to the passage of ERTA-1981 (on August 13, 1981) face date-of-death tax prices. For decedents dying on or after ERTA-1981, expectations are captured in the tax price by using the fully phased-in tax schedule. Results of Tobit regressions for fi lers are presented in panel A of Table 9. 26 Both price and wealth are significantly related to charitable bequests. Notice that the price elasticity estimates are much smaller (ranging from -0.58 to -0.45), and the wealth elasticity estimates slightly larger (from 1.09 to 1.22), than the estimates that use the date-of-death and date-of-will tax prices in Tables 5 and 6. Approximately 7.9 percent of filers rewrote their wills after ERTA-1981. Since these individuals are the most likely to have wills that refl ect future tax rates from ERTA-1981, I incorporate this information in a second specifi cation. In Table 9 . Price and wealth elasticity estimates are closer to the estimates that use date-of-death and date-of-will estimates than in the previous specifi cation. However, price elasticity estimates remain smaller (ranging from -1.09 to -0.96), and wealth elasticity estimates larger (1.06 to 1.20), than estimates that use the date-ofdeath and date-of-will tax prices.
Examination of the Marital Deduction
Most previous studies employ the marital deduction as a source of variation. To examine the effect of this assumption on the price elasticity, I repeat the regression from Table 5 , panel I, specifi cation (2), with this additional source of variation. Eligible spousal bequests are subtracted from the net estate before determining the marginal tax rate. This approach implicitly assumes that spousal bequests are exogenously determined before charitable bequests. The results of this regression are presented in Table 10 , column 1. Notice, by comparing these two regressions, that the price elasticity with the marital deduction (-0.62) is only slightly larger than the elasticity without the marital deduction (-0.60) . 27 This suggests that the assumption of predetermined spousal bequests does not substantially bias the price elasticity estimate in this data set.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 10 illustrate that price elasticities differ for married and non-married decedents. The price elasticity estimate for non-married de- cedents, -0.65, is close to the estimate for the entire sample and much larger than the estimate for married decedents, -0.49. The wealth elasticity estimates of 1.02 and 1.06 for non-married and married, respectively, are very close to the 1.07 estimate from the entire sample.
Although use of the marital deduction does not bias the price elasticity estimate in these data, these results do not address the issue of whether or not spousal bequests are truly predetermined. Many previous studies make this assumption, but none offers evidence that it is actually valid. To address this issue, I run a series of regressions that include the price of spousal bequests as a regressor. If spousal bequests are exogenously determined, one would not expect the price of spousal bequests to be a signifi cant determinant of charitable bequests. Similarly, one would not expect the price of charitable bequests to be a signifi cant determinant of spousal bequests.
In column 4, the price of spousal bequests is added to the regression of married decedents only. This price is signifi cant with an estimated cross-price elasticity of 0.29. The elasticity of the charity price increases slight ly, to -0.51, when the spouse price is added.
Columns 5 and 6 present Tobit regressions specifying spousal bequests/wealth as the dependent variable.
28 Both the spouse price and charity price are found to be signifi cantly related to spousal bequests. The elasticity of spousal bequests with respect to the spouse price is -0.57. The cross-price elasticity of spousal bequests with respect to the charity price is 0.13.
These results suggest that spousal bequests are not exogenously determined before charitable bequests. The signifi cance of the cross-price elasticities in both the charitable bequest and spousal bequest equations suggests that decedents consider both prices when making spousal bequests and charitable bequests. Although the assumption of predetermined spousal bequests does not signifi cantly bias the price elasticity in these data, it clearly does not correctly represent the charitable-spousal bequest decision. Previous studies that exploit the marital deduction as a source of variation may be relying on an incorrect model of bequest behavior.
How Would the Reduction or Repeal of the Estate Tax Affect Charitable Bequests?
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) was enacted in June of 2001. This act gradually phases out the federal estate tax until its repeal in 2010. However, under a sunset provision, repeal will last only one year. Unless further legislative action is taken, the tax will revert to the 2001 estate tax rules in 2011. Table 11 presents the predicted effects of the reduction and repeal of the estate tax that will be brought about by EGTRRA. The table entries are the predicted percentage of after tax wealth left to charity under different tax regimes.
29 The Table 5 model using the quadratic specifi cation and the date-of-death tax price is used to make the predictions. Alternate models do not change the conclusions. Filers are defi ned as having been fi lers in the sample period, 1980-1982. EGTRRA is predicted to reduce charitable giving considerably. The fi rst row of Table 11 predicts that the average fi ler will leave 7.74 percent of after tax wealth to charity during the sample period. In 2001, the exemption level increases to $600,000, the top marginal tax rate drops to 55 percent, and the California inheritance tax is no longer assessed. Under this regime and with wealth infl ated to 2001 levels, the prediction drops to 5.96 percent. This reduction is the net effect of lower tax rates and larger after tax wealth. In 2009, the year before repeal under EGTRRA, the exemption level increases to $3.5 million and the top marginal rate drops to 45 percent. Under this regime, the predicted value of charitable bequests falls further, to 3.46 percent of after tax wealth. If the federal estate tax is repealed, as is 28 Since nearly 49 percent of married decedents leave their entire estate to their spouses, I censor the data at one rather than zero. Only 5.5 percent of married decedents in the data leave nothing to their spouse; accounting for censoring at both one and zero using a two-limit Tobit model did not change the conclusions. 29 Predicted values are computed for each individual. The table entries are the unweighted average of these predicted values over all individuals. Standard errors are computed using the Delta method.
expected in 2010, the predicted value falls to 1.98 percent. The drop in charitable bequests is especially large since 91 percent of the total charitable bequests in the data are made by fi lers. Repeal of the California inheritance tax has similar ramifi cations for non-fi lers. In column 2 of Table 11 , the predicted value of charitable bequests is equal to 4.38 percent of after tax wealth during the sample period, 1980-1982. Repeal of the California inheritance is predicted to reduce the percentage of after tax wealth left to charity to 2.09 percent.
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CONCLUSION
This paper explores the effect of the estate tax, via the charitable deduction, on charitable bequests. Using a large data set of San Francisco County decedents and employing cross-year variation in tax rates, this study adds to the existing literature by relaxing assumptions about functional form and the marital deduction, estimating price elasticities using the date-of-will tax price, and estimating price elasticities for non-wealthy estates that are not subject to the federal estate tax.
Results from a number of different models suggest that estate and inheritance taxes are signifi cantly related to charitable bequests for both fi lers and non-fi lers of the federal estate tax return. The results for fi lers are consistent with most previous studies. Non-fi lers are subject only to the California inheritance tax and represent the part of the wealth distribution that has been ignored in previous studies.
Models that rely on functional form assumptions for identifi cation may produce biased elasticity estimates. Specifi cally, excluding nonlinear estate terms from the charitable bequest equation leads to overestimation of the price elasticity, and underestimation of the wealth elasticity, for federal estate tax fi lers. Although it is impossible to know the correct functional form a priori, the models in this paper suggest that the quadratic specifi cation captures much of the nonlinear wealth effect for fi lers. By adding a quadratic wealth term to the linear wealth specifi cation, the price elasticity estimate drops from -1.45 to -1.25, and the wealth elasticity increases from 1.04 to 1.13. When a cubic wealth term is also added, the price and wealth elasticities do not change. Future studies on charitable bequests should attempt to control for nonlinear wealth effects in order to avoid this potential bias. For non-fi lers, excluding nonlinear wealth terms also affects the price elasticity estimate, but not in the direction expected. Price elasticity estimates for non-fi lers are larger when nonlinear wealth terms are added to the linear wealth specifi ca- 30 Given that the price elasticity estimates for non-fi lers are greater than the estimates for fi lers, one might expect repeal to decrease charitable bequests by a greater amount for non-fi lers. However, the larger observed response for fi lers can be explained by a larger change in price. Repeal increases the price of charitable bequests from 0.61 to one for fi lers, and only 0.94 to one for non-fi lers.
tion. The date-of-death price elasticity estimates for non-fi lers range from -6.16 to -5.72. Evidence suggests that using the marital deduction as a source of variation does not substantially bias the price elasticity estimate. However, results from charitable and spousal bequest regressions suggest that the assumption of predetermined spousal bequests is an incorrect model of the charitable bequest-spousal bequest decision.
The date-of-will tax price is significantly related to charitable bequests for both fi lers and non-fi lers of the federal estate tax return. For fi lers, price elasticity estimates from date-of-will tax rates are greater than or equal to price elasticity estimates from date-of-death tax rates. This suggests that the tax schedule in place at the time the will is written is at least as important as the one in place at the time of death. The price elasticity estimates from date-of-will and date-of-death tax prices are larger than estimates from models that use expected tax prices. For non-fi lers, price elasticity estimates from date-of-will tax rates are smaller than price elasticity estimates using date-ofdeath tax rates.
Repeal of the federal estate tax is predicted to decrease charitable bequests from 7.74 to 1.98 percent of after tax wealth for fi lers. This reduction is especially large since fi lers make 91 percent of total charitable bequests. Repeal of the California inheritance tax is predicted to decrease charitable bequests for non-fi lers from 4.38 to 2.09 percent of after tax wealth for non-fi lers.
